Freddie Papazyan Ph.D. Candidate at UC San Diego Economics
Welcome to my website!
My research is on political economics and economic theory. My recent projects are on power dynamics, dynamic games, strategic communication, and mechanism design.
Before joining UC San Diego I received a Master's in Applied Mathematics from the University of Southern California.
This paper provides a portable framework for analyzing how the balance-of-power in a group of people evolves over time. N non-overlapping generations of players compete for control over the group's wealth by accumulating power, modeled as capital that enhances one's ability to forcefully redistribute wealth. The choices players make in this dynamic contest determines how the group's balance-of-power evolves over time. In equilibrium, a group's initial balance-of-power determines the trajectory it takes, and indeed the steady-state it approaches. Three classes of steady-state are observed in equilibrium: Inclusive, Oligarchic, and Dictatorial. To reach an inclusive steady state (where all players are equally powerful), players must begin on roughly equal footing. Otherwise, the group heads towards dictatorship or oligarchy, where all power is held by one or a few players, respectively. In addition to providing a rigorous explanation for the observed tendency of large organizations to devolve into oligarchies, this paper also makes a sharp prediction about the effect of group size on the strength and feasibility of dictatorships.